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ABSTRACT: In this essay I provide one methodology that yields the level of analysis of 
an alleged knowledge-claim under investigation via its relations to varying gradations of 
scepticism. Each proposed knowledge-claim possesses a specified relationship with: (i) a 
globally sceptical argument; (ii) the least sceptical but successful argument that casts it 
into doubt; and (iii) the most sceptical yet unsuccessful argument, which is conceivably 
hypothesized to repudiate it but fails to do so. Yielding this specified set of relations, by 
means of proceeding from global scepticism to (ii) and (iii), increases the chances of 
identifying the highest evaluative relevancy of the levels of analysis and observation of 
an alleged knowledge-claim. I argue that the failure to analyse and derive a difference 
between (i) and (ii) with respect to an alleged knowledge-claim signifies that the claim 
is grounded within the theoretical framework itself, that the claim lacks specification 
with regard to content that is analysable via that framework, and the claim is dubious 
insofar as alternative theoretic frameworks may present greater relevancy to levels of 
observation.  
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magnification level, methodological scepticism 
 
1. Gradations of Scepticism: from Global-types to Perceptual Scepticisms 
Global scepticism is often considered a system of thought that utilises doubt so 
extensively that everything whatsoever is doubted, whereby the conclusion is 
formed that we do not and cannot know anything at all. Accordingly, we cannot 
even knowledgeably conclude that we do not know anything. 
Contrarily, Ken Gemes1 ascertains that it is generally presumed that “... it is 
logically possible that all one’s experience-based beliefs are false. But for a typical 
agent this is simply not possible.” For example, if one states both that “I have a left 
leg” and “It is not the case that my left leg is injured,” then one of those statements 
must be true. Moreover, one may know that at least one of those statements is 
true, which appears to oppose global scepticism.  
However, despite Gemes insight, global scepticism need not be defined 
more narrowly in order to express doubt with respect to any knowledge-claim or 
                                                                
1 Ken Gemes, “A refutation of global scepticism,” Analysis 69, 2 (2009): 218-219.   
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even every one of these claims altogether because the sceptic may still doubt the 
memories, expressions, attributions of modes and interpretations of them. 
Knowledge-claims also require more necessary conditions than experienced-based 
beliefs since no mere experience-based belief amounts to propositional knowledge. 
Globally sceptical hypotheses require that more necessary conditions be fulfilled 
than knowledge-claims do, which are claims that such hypotheses cast into 
suspicion. For these reasons I shall presume that globally sceptical arguments are 
inescapable.  
Other types of sceptical arguments, such as varieties of perceptual 
scepticism, lack the intensity and scope of global scepticism since less sceptical 
arguments do not produce the same type or overall amounts of doubt. For 
example, “visual perceptual scepticism” is less sceptical than “visual and auditory 
perceptual scepticism,” which involves arguments that conclude that one cannot 
know anything on the basis of one’s vision and hearing (i.e., with respect to the 
two sensory modalities in combination or individually). Different types of 
perceptual scepticism provide their frameworks, contexts and hypothetical 
examples at different levels of analysis than global scepticism, which requires the 
most stringent conditions under which one (or many) can know something. 
Various types of perceptual scepticism also provide different relations of 
relevancies to the arguments and knowledge-claims undergoing the analyses than 
other forms of scepticism do. Perceptual scepticism includes a vast range of levels 
of analyses that consist of several types of subdivisions, such as individual or 
combinations of sensory modalities (e.g., types of perceptual scepticism 
concerning vision, olfaction, taste etc.). Perceptual scepticism also involves 
varying roles of magnification levels concerning each of the sensory modalities 
and certain technologies (e.g., perceptual scepticism regarding the auditory mode 
and magnification levels via microphones that increase different intensities and 
volumes of sounds). Thus, there are various levels of analysis that are interrelated 
with varying grades of perceptual scepticism on the basis of sensory modes and 
magnification levels concerning each of the sensory modalities.  
For instance, visual perceptual scepticism applies to specific temporal 
intervals and microscopic levels of observation and analysis, which may involve 
doubting alleged knowledge-claims relevant to observational descriptions 
concerning specific magnification levels with microscopes. Consider the 
information obtained and recorded via describing visual observations made with a 
microscope and how one may apply versions of visual perceptual scepticism to 
specific ranges of magnification levels that are attainable via the usage of a 
microscope, i.e., without applying visual perceptual scepticism to other 
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observations that are presumably knowable via visual perceptions. One may 
reasonably doubt alleged knowledge-claims, concerning magnification levels of 
500X or higher, for example, which were concluded after observations and 
analysis of a microscopic organism with a specific microscope at some laboratory. 
Certain levels of magnification for observations by means of microscopes 
are required in order to properly analyse events, things or parts, which are only 
viewable at microscopic levels. Historical analyses demonstrate both the increase 
in sophistication of technological instruments for magnification that thereby 
increase the magnification levels for observing. The 19th century yielded less 
instruments for magnifying the intensity of sounds than the 20th century 
concerning microphones and speakers, including volume magnifications with 
hydrophones for auditory observations under water. Hence, the latter types of 
specified levels of visual or auditory perceptual scepticism are important for 
historical analyses, namely, with respect to the different sensory modalities for 
observation and different magnification levels of observation. Such levels of 
observation emerged as a result of the historical developments of technologies by 
pioneers, such as Antony van Leeuwenhoek who improved the microscope during 
the 17th century and helped found microbiology, and the father of nuclear 
physics, Ernest Rutherford, who improved and patented the hydrophone during 
World War I.   
The amount of relevancy, concerning more sceptical arguments, increases 
in relation to more specified levels of analysis and specified levels of observations 
in the following ranking order: (1) globally sceptical arguments, concluding that 
nothing that is recorded or remembered is known; (2) sceptical arguments 
concerning all perceptions that conclude no one can know anything on the basis 
of perception (e.g., because one may be dreaming or merely making claims about a 
virtual world); (3) visual perceptual scepticism arguments, concluding that one 
cannot know anything solely on the basis of visual perceptions (e.g., because visual 
illusions and hallucinations cannot be controlled or realization requires the 
accompaniment of another sensory modality in order to account for non-veridical 
visual observations); (4) sceptical arguments concluding that one cannot know 
about some organism at magnification levels of 500X or higher; and (5) perceptual 
scepticism that is applied to magnification levels above 500X and a specific range 
of time periods during which observational descriptions could not be reliably 
made with particular microscopes at certain laboratories (e.g., since the era lacked 
the technology, the recorded and alleged claim is dubious).  
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(5) may very well enable us to distinguish between the propositional 
knowledge of Antony van Leeuwenhoek and his speculative postulations or 
conjectures concerning his observational descriptions of spermatozoa, bacteria etc.  
2. Methodology of Scepticism: Analysing Knowledge-Claims 
A methodological value subsists in globally sceptical arguments. Valid arguments 
for global scepticism provide upper limitations for comprehensive analytic 
frameworks concerning knowledge (i.e., the most stringent set of necessary or 
sufficient conditions for attaining knowledge), or else theoretic frameworks must 
account for their ineffectiveness. Theoretical frameworks contain multiple levels 
of analyses, with which proposed knowledge-claims are, demonstrably, more 
dubious as the amount of necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge 
increase.  
Moreover, any knowledge-claim may be evaluated in accordance with 
specified relations of relevancy concerning three crucial levels of analyses: (i) the 
level of analysis of the globally sceptical argument (i.e., the most sceptical type of 
argument); (ii) the level of analysis of less sceptical arguments that are still able to 
cast the claim into doubt and are most relevant to the context of significance or 
most appropriate level of analysis of the alleged knowledge-claim; and (iii) the 
level of analysis of the most sceptical argument that is nevertheless unable to 
repudiate the alleged knowledge-claim.  
This approach of methodological scepticism requires the analyst to restrict 
herself to specific realms of knowledge for the purpose of analysing the alleged 
knowledge-claim in relation to domains of discourse that vary. One underlying 
principle supporting such an approach can be viewed in Barry Stroud’s work when 
he states that: 
Scepticism is most illuminating when restricted to particular areas of knowledge 
... because it then rests on distinctive and problematic features of the alleged 
knowledge in question, not simply on some completely general conundrum in 
the notion of knowledge itself, or in the very idea of reasonable belief.2 
An analysis yielding (iii) incorporates scepticism that is slightly less 
sceptical than (ii). Thus, (iii) restricts itself to a more specified area of knowledge. 
(iii) involves the usage of scepticism that strongly supports the claim under 
investigation, demonstrating its validity at the highest level. Methodologies 
proceeding in order from (i) to (iii), presuming that there are typically various 
                                                                
2 Barry Stroud, Understanding Human Knowledge: Philosophical Essays (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 291.  
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levels of analyses between (i) and (ii), allow an analyst to ascertain a degree of 
certainty at a level of analysis and observation in-between (ii) and (iii). 
One may well inquire why (i) is necessary for the proposed methodology of 
scepticism. I suggest that (i) is important for the same reason that a man with a 
large foot tends to find it comforting to purchase from a shoe store that also 
possesses the same models of shoes that are larger than those models he finds 
comfortable. If he buys the largest size of a model from a store without testing 
anything larger, he lacks an understanding of whether or not that particular 
model is best-suited for his wear. The same line of reasoning holds for that which 
fits into only the smallest models.  
Where the abovementioned analogy differs, concerning the current 
proposal for methodological scepticism and an individual’s method of testing 
shoes, is with respect to (iii) and the largest size of a model of shoes that 
nonetheless does not fit the potential customer. For there is generally no great 
obstacle with respect to finding a less sceptical argument than another one that is 
also unable to defeat the knowledge-claim undergoing the methodological analysis 
(i.e., something less sceptical than (iii)).  
Although the “least sceptical argument,” which casts a knowledge-claim 
into doubt, may not be definitively discoverable, the approximation of the level of 
analysis, from which the least sceptical argument can be derived, is applied 
specifically in order to provide a meta-analysis that analyses the analyses of the 
derivations of (ii) and (iii) in order to identify the highest levels of relevancy of 
the levels of observation and analysis. 
2.1. Inability to Distinguish between Global Scepticism and Slightly Less 
Scepticisms 
The distinction or lack of distinction drawn between (i) and (ii) with respect to a 
specific knowledge-claim is useful in relation to that claim’s analysability and for 
illustrating how fundamental certain concepts and types of claims are with respect 
to any theoretical framework within which one works. The inability to ascertain a 
difference between (i) and (ii) with respect to some alleged knowledge-claim 
signifies constraints of the theoretic framework, within which one works, and 
indicates dubiousness (i.e., with respect to the claim’s relevancy to other types of 
knowledge-claims) as well as the possibility for alternative systems or opposing 
theoretic frameworks.  
For instance, according to Kris McDaniel:  
The epistemology of the possible and the actual is fundamentally different: for 
example, we can know a priori that there is a merely possible talking donkey, but 
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we cannot know a priori that there is an actual talking donkey. The merely 
possible are governed by a principle of plentitude that does not govern the 
actual: at the very least, for every way that something actual could be, there is 
something possible that is that way. The hypothesis that these epistemological 
and metaphysical differences are grounded in different ways of existing is both 
viable and intellectually satisfying.3 
McDaniel presents us with two different alleged knowledge-claims, which 
demonstrate an aspect of the expansiveness of his theoretic framework4 in 
addition to upper and lower limitations that appear to be at least impervious to 
various degrees of high levels of scepticism, regarding knowing what is possible, 
but easily yield to lower levels of scepticism with regard to knowledge a priori 
about what is actual. For instance, his first claim entails that it is possible to know 
a priori that some “merely possible talking donkey” is somewhere. With such a 
claim McDaniel expands the potential realm of a priori knowledge to include 
perhaps disjunctive claims, such as “x is necessary, contingently real or unreal, but 
not impossible,” i.e., where “x” is equivalent to “any merely possible thing or 
event.”  
McDaniel’s second claim entails that it is impossible to know a priori that 
some actual talking donkey is somewhere. Of course, one reason why that might 
be considered impossible to know is that it is false that there is any talking 
donkey. However, McDaniel leaves the option available that it is true that perhaps 
donkeys secretively and actually talk, although we cannot know that they actually 
talk. The conjunction of the two propositions shows that McDaniel’s concept of a 
donkey incorporates the “possibility or potential to talk” as well as the ability to 
have knowledge of that possibility a priori, but he argues for the inability to have 
knowledge a priori of an actual talking donkey.  
                                                                
3 See chapter 10 in David Chalmers, David Manley,and Ryan Wasserman, Metametaphysics: 
New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 315-
316.  
4 The greater expansiveness of a system of thought or theoretical framework presents difficulties 
with respect to critically evaluating that system’s comprehensiveness. However, such systems 
become susceptible to criticisms concerning their lack of concision as well as their lack of 
internal and external consistency (i.e., evaluated on the basis of possessing internal 
contradictions or being inconsistent with other systems or with reality) and lack of practicality 
or application. McDaniel’s two alleged knowledge-claims would be presumed false by David 
Lewis’s theory within his On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1986), for 
instance, if McDaniel had attempted to distinguish between the ability to know about a merely 
possible talking donkey from the inability to know about a “real” talking donkey. So, his careful 
usage of terminology (i.e., stating “actual” instead of “real”) allows him to maintain consistency 
within at least two theoretic frameworks.  
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What is problematic for McDaniel is for him to answer whether or not we 
can know a priori that there is an actual talking human because if we can or do 
indeed know this, then the very concept of a human (i.e., as opposed to a donkey) 
would seem to incorporate talkativeness on the basis of actual talking as opposed 
to merely possible talking, despite the fact that some humans are actually mute. 
Accordingly, one may claim to know a priori that there is no actual talking 
donkey since the concept of a donkey (i.e., derived from ethology, cladistics and 
evolutionary biology) excludes talkativeness. Of course, the latter alleged 
knowledge-claim is open to scepticism but so is McDaniel’s entire epistemological 
distinction between knowing a priori what is possible and knowing a priori what 
is actual.  
McDaniel’s theoretical framework provides only one alternative system of 
thought with respect to describing the relations between knowledge, possibility, 
actuality and scepticism. For instance, an opposing system is viewable both within 
the ancient Megareans and Spinoza’s philosophies, which maintain that there is 
nothing that is both possible and unreal, and anything that never occurs is also 
impossible.5 So, according to Megaric philosophy, if there is (actually) never a 
talking donkey, then there cannot be “a merely possible talking donkey,” which 
contradicts McDaniel’s claims insofar as the epistemology of the possible and 
actual are closely intertwined.  So, the merely possible need not be “governed by a 
principle of plentitude that does not govern the actual,” i.e., in stark contrast to 
McDaniel’s system.  
The major difference between McDaniel’s system and the Megaric one is 
that McDaniel misrecognizes something if it is originally considered to be possible 
but contingently unreal, and then it is later recognized as unreal but also 
impossible, whereas a Megarean misrecognizes something if it is originally 
considered to be possible, and then it is recognized as unreal. The Megaric system 
argues against there being any value in claims about “merely possible things” since 
the importance of something resides in it being real and substantial.  
The addition of an alternative system, such as the Megaric system, 
illustrates that the level of analysis reached via global scepticism is fundamentally 
higher than any particular system of thought. System thinking produces 
fundamental parts of problem thinking, and problem thinking places each system 
in opposition with their alternatives without any favouritism toward any specific 
                                                                
5 More about the topic of the Megarean system can be found in Nicolai Hartmann,“Der 
Megarische Und Der Aristotelische Möglichkeitsbegriff. Ein Beiträg Zur Geschichte Des 
Ontologischen Modalitätsproblems,” Abhandlungen der Preussichen Akademie der 
Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-Historische Klasse 10 (1937): 1-17. 
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system. The distinction drawn between (i) and (ii) demonstrates an attempt to 
reach more specified levels of observation and analysis regarding the alleged 
knowledge-claim, whereas the failure to draw a distinction between (i) and (ii) 
serves as an indicator that the claim presumes stricter conditions that are directly 
related to the ability to attain knowledge, for instance.  
McDaniel’s alleged knowledge-claim that “we can know a priori that there 
is a merely possible talking donkey” is one example of the failure to draw a 
distinction between (i) and (ii) partially because it undermines global scepticism. 
Therefore, the alleged knowledge-claim may best be characterised as a 
presumption of the theoretical framework or as a speculative assumption that 
outlines the expansiveness of that particular system, which is comparable with 
other systems and, thus, dubious in accordance with problem thinking.   
2.2. Order of the Methodology of Scepticism 
Figure 1 illustrates an aspect of the scheme of the proposed methodology for 
utilising different grades of scepticism with ordered steps that approach a 
discovery of the level of analysis, at which an alleged knowledge-claim is most 
relevant, and the degree of certainty, with which the claim is best ascertained. I 
suggest that the analyst apply scepticism methodologically, first, from the most 
sceptical and then proceed toward the least sceptical counter-arguments in order 
to discover the particular amount of reassurance that is ascertainable about 
knowledge-claims concerning observations. This entails the utilization of ordering 
the analysis from (1) to (5) concerning proposed knowledge-claims that 
incorporate visual descriptions of microscopic organisms, for example. Lastly, 
methodological scepticism and the production of a meta-analysis, concerning (i), 
(ii) and (iii), may prove most useful when hypotheses about the least sceptical but 
successful arguments (i.e., (ii)) and most sceptical but unsuccessful arguments (i.e., 
(iii)) are formed, concerning the attempts to repeatedly repudiate and then to 
reconfirm each claim undergoing the investigation. 
An initial formation of hypotheses for (ii) and (iii) before the usage of 
methodological scepticism may allow hypotheses to undergo testing in a similar 
way to the scientific method, although the most highly relevant levels of analyses 
(i.e., concerning (ii)and (iii)) lack a direct relationship with observation that 
scientific methodology has. The analysis of knowledge is thereby approximated 
and balanced between (ii) and (iii), awaiting further relevant, observational data.  
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e.g., Descartes’ evil genius  
argument, Russell’s 5 min.6 
hypothesis, fallible memory etc. 
 
        
        
e.g., Zhuangzi’s dream  
argument, Arguments on 
living in computer simulations 
(e.g., The Matrix) etc.  
 
         
 
e.g., scepticism about what  
is “seen” on the basis of visual  
hallucinations and illusions.  
          
  
        
 
 
e.g., scepticism about what can 
be known via technologies yielding 
higher magnification levels for  
visual observations, i.e., telescopes 
and microscopes etc.  
 
  
The methodological approach of scepticism I offer here requires the analyst 
to restrict herself to some particular area of knowledge or domain of discourse 
while utilising varying levels of scepticism in stages in order to produce a “meta-
analysis,” namely, an analysis of sceptical arguments both able and unable to 
refute the alleged knowledge-claim. The “higher levels of analyses” in Fig. 1 are 
those that involve the most stringent and complex demarcation criteria for the 
                                                                
6 See Lecture IX Memory in Bertrand Russell, The Analysis of Mind (London: George Allen & 
Unwin LTD, 1921), 159.  
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possession of knowledge. The “more specified levels of observation” concern the 
precision of measurements, specific magnification levels, and specified units of 
time concerning the observation undergoing the investigation in relation to the 
alleged knowledge-claim. 
This sceptical methodological approach aims to provide a meta-analysis of 
successfully sceptical arguments with their interrelationships to the analysis of 
unsuccessful sceptical arguments, which all directly concern the alleged 
knowledge under investigation. The meta-analysis provides higher levels of 
relevancy from which evaluations are made with grades of certainty in proportion 
to their identifiable localities in relation to global-type sceptical analyses. The 
relevant and localisable level, which is identified via the meta-analysis,is 
approximated via (ii) and (iii) (i.e., by means of “the least sceptical but successfully 
sceptical arguments and hypotheses” in combination with “the most sceptical but 
unsuccessfully sceptical arguments”). 
An analyst who is familiar with the effectiveness of methodological 
scepticism may begin by forming hypotheses for (ii) and (iii). Methodological 
scepticism best begins the analysis of the alleged knowledge-claim from the most 
stringent and sceptical hypotheses and argumentative approach (i.e., global-types 
of scepticism) and proceeds step by step to ever less sceptical hypotheses, 
attempting to hallmark (ii) and (iii) in order to approximate the highest level of 
relevancy of the proposed claim. The methodology is applicable to numerous types 
of scepticism since types of scepticism generally involve gradations of greater and 
lesser amounts, including modal scepticism, ethical scepticism, religious scepticism 
etc., although this essay refrains from further addressing the latter types of 
scepticism. 
3. Relations of Knowledge to Grades of Scepticism and Certainty 
Many arguments, such as arguments that maintain that forgetfulness is both 
always possible and impedes knowledge at any point, demonstrate that scepticism 
is epistemically inescapable. So, in essence, there is no knowledge-claim that 
cannot be doubted to some degree. Even Descartes’ famous claim “I think; 
therefore, I am” has been demonstrated to be dubious with respect to individuals 
inflicted with Cotard’s delusion, under which condition individuals form 
consistent webs of beliefs that they are dead, brain-dead and decomposing.7 Thus, 
thinking may be insufficient for one to knowledgably conclude that one exists.  
                                                                
7 A. W. Young and K. M. Leafhead,  “Betwixt Life and Death: Case Studies of the Cotard 
Delusion,” in Method in Madness: Case studies in Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, eds. P. W. 
Halligan and J. C. Marshall (Hove, Sussex: Psychology Press, 1996), 155. 
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The degree to which a proposed knowledge-claim is doubted is the level of 
analysis that extends beyond the realms from which the evidence and relevant 
claim are derived. That is, scepticism allows any claim to be doubted via extending 
further than the level of observation and analysis, from which the claim is 
decidedly concluded. A series of different types and lower grades of sceptical 
arguments allow us to determine the level of certainty with which we can 
evaluate some given statement and lines of argumentation as proposed knowledge-
claims, specifically when lower gradations of sceptical arguments include (ii) and 
(iii). 
Stephen Maitzen maintains that: 
... if there are domains whose truths we cannot know, then there must be claims 
outside those domains that we cannot know even if they are true. ... Understood 
as a thesis, skepticism about a domain of discourse is the epistemological claim 
that no one knows any of the true propositions that the domain may contain.8 
Maitzen argues that it is impossible to contain scepticism within a specific 
domain of discourse (i.e., localising scepticism), which is consistent with a 
methodological approach that attempts to describe alleged knowledge in relation 
to each of the domains of discourse in order to discover the domain of the highest 
relevance to the alleged knowledge.  
I agree with Maitzen and emphasise that scepticism is required in order to 
form accurate analyses of knowledge-claims and ought to be unleashed upon each 
of the specific domains of discourse in order to provide the locations of 
knowledge-claims within analytic frameworks constructed via rational processes 
of grading types of scepticism and levels of scepticism in relation to one another. 
Levelling the analysis of knowledge via methodological scepticism is requisite in 
order to understand the relevant levels of observation (i.e., regarding 
magnification levels, sensory modalities, time intervals etc.), levels of analysis (i.e., 
critical, sceptical etc.) and degrees of certainty.  
I also agree with Nicolai Hartmann who stated that:  
Everything in life that we call our knowledge is in actuality a bundle of 
knowledge and misapprehension. We do not have a direct criterion of truth; 
truth is not a graspable moment of content of the realization, but is rather a 
relation to something, which we do not recognize other than through our level 
of knowledge, as the subject matter. All verification proceeds in the circuitous 
way of the testing of the subject matter. The consciousness of the subject matter 
cannot generally, in life, temporise each verification, which it anticipates, 
                                                                
8 Stephen Maitzen, “The Impossibility of Local Skepticism,” Philosophia. 34 (2006): 453-464.  
Maitzen makes these claims on page 453.   
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complements, combines and takes for truth the unexamined product. Also the 
sciences are not free from this, and every researcher knows it well and reckons 
with the source of misapprehension; but also the researcher must still reckon 
with the still vague chance of the encounter, letting the unproven and 
hypothetical apply, whereby the correct estimates of the grade of certainty of it 
can never be certain. It creates theories that become controversial and advocated 
and must become, once again, allowed to be abandoned. After all, they correct 
themselves within the course of time; the science advances, and that, which 
proves to be valid, subsists.9 
Degrees of certainty ascertained via methodological scepticism are open to 
the same criticisms and additional scepticism since any analysis yielding a degree 
of certainty may be confronted with a meta-analysis that applies scepticism to it. 
However, the methodology of scepticism, which I have provided, presents a 
rigorous and critical method that utilises instruments from the philosopher’s tool 
kit in addition to the observational descriptions of science, contributing with a 
specific order of steps from which we can work.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                
9 Nicolai Hartmann, Der philosophische Gedanke und seine Geschichte (Stuttgart: Reclam, 
1936/1977), 4-5 (translation by William A. Brant).  
